Opportunistic encroachment by the national government on state policy domains erodes the robustness of federal unions. Theories of electoral and political safeguards of federalism suggest that the political process protects federalism's boundaries. This article develops a theory distinguishing risk-seeking and risk-avoiding political behavior and applies its insights to the debate about the sufficiency of the political process to police federalism. Under average conditions, the political process deters encroachment, but under more extreme conditions it fails: elected officials set policy according to the risk associated with their electoral retention rather than the policy's expected return to the voters or the health of the federation; this manipulation of the risk environment may lead a central government to encroach upon a state's domain opportunistically. The federal problem of credit assignment exposes a weakness in the political safeguards theory to protect federalism's boundaries: electoral mechanisms both encourage and discourage encroachment. Due to this fallibility in the political process, judicial intervention in federalism disputes may be justified.
In New York v. United States, 1 the Supreme Court struck down a portion of a federal law regulating the disposal of low-level radioactive waste. The 5-member majority of the Court objected to a provision requiring states to take title of the radioactive waste they produced because it confused electoral accountability in the federal system. In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the justices reasoned that dissatisfied voters might punish the state politicians charged with executing the law, rather than the federal lawmakers responsible for writing it.
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The court justified its intervention by arguing that it wanted to bolster electoral accountability. Why would voters need the court's help? This paper highlights a flaw in the logic of electoral accountability and federalism. With the aid of a straightforward model, the paper derives conditions when elected officials would set policy according to the risk associated with their electoral retention, rather than the policy's expected return to the voters. Federalism suffers from a credit assignment problem: rather than serving as a constraint, policing federal action, under conditions described below the electorate is the motivation for the encroachment. The political process is insufficient-at times even counterproductive-and judicial safeguards demonstrate their usefulness.
The blurring of jurisdictional lines-and often electoral accountability-comes naturally to an evolving federation as powers are adjusted, both purposefully, in response 1 New York v United States, 505 US 144 (1992) . 2 The court further elaborated their reasoning in U. S. Term Limits v Thornton, 514 US 779 (1995) and Printz v United States, 521 US 98 (1997) , striking down state laws limiting the terms of federal representatives and a federal law requiring county sheriffs to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers, respectively. In rejecting these laws, the court underscored the importance of independent accountability between levels of government for the vitality of federalism: the U.S. constitution "establish [ed] two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it" (quoting from U.S. Term Limits, 514 US at 883).
to a changing environment, and as a by-product of political manipulation. The federal government can augment, parallel, or otherwise intervene in state government authority by encumbering state governments, for example by charging them with the execution of federal legislation on cleaner air and equal access for people with disabilities, or by implementing mandates that create federal regulatory power through its spending power.
More severe federal encroachments include the assumption of full policy responsibility for duties traditionally carried out by the states, such as Roosevelt's establishment of the national welfare state, or Kennedy's 1963 federalization of Alabama's national guard to enforce school desegregation. Encroachment in other federal systems can be even more disruptive of the intergovernmental balance: in Argentina and India, encroachment can include federal dismissal of provincial legislatures and substitution of a federal manager, a federal suspension of the provincial democratic process that sometimes lasts for years.
Federalism is on its firmest footing when the boundaries between federal and state governments are consistent and changes are accepted as legitimate by all. What triggers opportunistic encroachment? There are two intuitive responses. First, the center may encroach for partisan reasons: there may be ideological differences between the center and region, or the center may be captured by some regions and get co-opted into a scheme to shift burdens from one region to another. Alternatively, the center may encroach on efficiency grounds: technological or informational advances make the center a more logical location for policy design and implementation. This article explores a third, counterintuitive motivation: electoral incentives encourage encroachment. The electoral incentives stem from federalism's divided structure, and as a structural problem, encroachment therefore becomes inherent to all federations. Madison, the original structural safeguards theorist, does not deny that the different governments might want to encroach upon one another's jurisdictions, but he argues that the watchful public will prohibit such encroachments unless they have decided that it is in their own best interests to allow it. The electorate restrains the federal government's motivation to encroach.
While political and structural safeguards theorists would criticize the New York court for its intervention, the Court agrees with them in spirit: the electoral process
should not be impeded. This article pushes the Court's logic further. When the federal government encroaches to create an accountability problem, the electoral process has failed to safeguard federalism through its deterrence mechanism. This article argues that exclusive supervision of the federal bargain is beyond the capacity of the electorate because the electoral system creates contradictory impulses: at the same time that it controls the urge to encroach, it encourages encroachment. The article defines the conditions when the latter force will dominate, triggering encroachment.
I. THE PROBLEM OF CREDIT ASSIGNMENT
Dividing power-whether horizontally, through separation of powers, or vertically, as with federalism-creates two intertwined problems for republican government: efficiency and efficacy. First and foremost is the question of efficiency:
how well does the electoral mechanism provide incentives for the fragmented government to maximize the expected utility from its joint efforts? Secondly, if voters erect a constitution in the hopes of devising an efficient allocation of tasks between governments, how well does the electoral mechanism prohibit one government from encroaching on the jurisdiction of another? The problems are linked: the efficiency of the system depends on the efficacy of the mechanism that maintains it.
The problem can be generalized as follows. When a principal's utility-in our case, the voters'-depends upon the actions of two or more agents, and agents have some choice in their action, an efficient allocation of effort is not guaranteed. Consider this problem: 327 (2005) . Although the models are different on many dimensions, Volden makes two assumptions that set his results apart from mine importantly. First, he makes the assumption that voters know which level of government is most efficient at each activity. Second, he assumes that voters will punish a government for entering into a policy realm when another government is more efficient. I have chosen to have my voters respond to governmental performance and let the credit assignment be a random variable, rather than equal to relative capacity. Without it, we could not see the effects of playing variance off mean that I am able to generate. Moreover, by assuming that voters are perfectly able to distinguish
II. A MODEL OF ENCROACHMENT
To understand the conditions that support structurally-motivated encroachment, I begin with a minimal definition of federalism. Two electorally independent layers of government, central and regional, share powers, with some powers allocated as regional, some as central, and others as shared jurisdictions. For simplicity, consider a single agent at the center and a single agent at the regional level, both representing the same constituency (such as a Governor and a Senator). The central government's goal is to be reelected.
The center can choose to encroach or not.
HANDICAP (θ): To focus on the cases where one would be least likely to find encroachment, that is, to rule out cases where encroachment can be simply explained by efficiency, I make the assumption that the center is more competent within its own jurisdiction than within the regional government's. In other words, I assume that the central government has been allocated jurisdictions for which it is competent, but make no assumptions that it deserves, by merit of its talents, to acquire further powers. Instead, I assume that some obstacle handicaps the center's ability to perform on policy when it encroaches: perhaps it faces legal or political challenges that force it to adopt inefficient policy, or the start up costs of policy innovation are high, or perhaps it simply has limited capacity in the jurisdiction.
In the model, the center's handicap, θ, lies strictly between 0 and 1, guaranteeing that the center is strictly less competent in regional affairs than its own:
Environmental circumstances affect the translation of the center's action to electoral credit. This stochastic uncertainty, represented generically by ω, is assumed to be uniformly distributed 7 on an interval which depends on the policy realm: the outcomes of some policies are much more predictable than others. When the center does not encroach, the parameter When the center encroaches, the policy domain changes; this new policy domain has a natural degree of uncertainty captured by the interval defined by ε rather than δ. An encroaching policy has an additional component to uncertainty: in encroaching, the center enters the turf of the regional government, and the success of the policy (and credit that the center may hope to claim from it) is affected by the regional government's ability, ρ.
A highly talented regional government increases the likelihood of an outcome favorable to the voters, but in keeping with Justice O'Connor's reasoning in the New York decision, when jurisdictions are shared accountability is confused. The center may be able to claim credit for all that the regional government has accomplished, but on the downside, a talented regional government may also be better able to capture full credit for the outcome, and even cause the voters to resent the federal government's intervention. A regional government of low ability is unlikely to contribute to success of the policy, but it is also less likely to be able to claim credit for the accomplishments of the central government, and the voters are more likely to thank the center for its encroachment, rather than resent its intrusion. To simplify the exposition, the model will assume (Univ Michigan, 1989) . In this model, voters evaluate the outcome against their expectations, and know whether or not a politician participated in policy in that area, but not whether or not the policy actually affected the outcome.
It is perfectly intuitive to think that the voters might have two different thresholds depending upon the center's activity. Such amendment to the model would generate further comparative statics but not affect the current results. For parsimony, the model has a single threshold.
modified by the handicap parameter, and second, the uncertainty surrounding the credit the center derives from its action is a function of the policy domain's natural random variance and the region's simultaneous activities, including its attempts to claim credit.
Voter utility follows the schedule:
when the center does not encroach, and
] and # ( 0,1 ( ) when it does. Recall that θ is the central government's handicap when it encroaches on the regional government's policy domain.
III. RESULTS
Ideally, the central government would compare the expected utility of each alternative action and choose the action with the higher expected utility to the voters. In this model, the central government would compare the expected values of encroaching and restraint.
By assumption, the central government is better able to accomplish its own projects than those in the regional jurisdiction (recall θ < 1). So, given the fact that the expected value of not encroaching is higher, why would a benevolent, public-serving central government ever encroach? That is, why would the electoral mechanism within the political safeguards of federalism fail?
We must bear in mind that politicians are not rewarded for maximizing the voters' total utility, but instead, by meeting a threshold for reelection. They don't need to be perfect, merely good enough. Just as a gambler puts down another bet on the chance that he might win big, a politician might pursue a risky policy to maximize his reelection chances.
When making decisions under uncertainty with the objective of surpassing a threshold, the range of possible outcomes matters as much as expected value. Weitzman contained the following elegant insight: when hoping to generate the highest possible outcome, one might accept a lower average payoff if it includes higher variance. Politically, the goal is often to avoid the possibility of the worst occurring, so in political science we should extend his insight to include cases where one might sacrifice average expectation for lower variance, if it improves the downside outcome. I employ and extend this logic to derive conclusions relating the ability of the two governments, voter expectations, and encroachment.
Not all central government agents are equally capable. In this model reelection is determined by an evaluation-a measure of voter satisfaction-that is compared to the voter's threshold. Some governments are sufficiently capable that they expect to exceed the threshold, without encroaching. For others the expectation is more pessimistic.
Consider the competence of the central government relative to the voters' threshold. Those of higher type would like to distinguish themselves from the lower types, and the lower would like to disguise their low ability. The results show that both high and low types find it advantageous to encroach to compare themselves to the regional government in their appeal to the voters, but under different conditions.
Figures 1 and 2 graph the probability that the center is reelected for each level of ability.
In Figure 1 , the government does not encroach. It is always reelected if its ability is above 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
In Figure 2 , the government encroaches. The internal endpoints change to reflect the different noise term and the center's handicap. Recall that the center is not as capable when it encroaches as when it doesn't; in a sense, it uses its resources less efficiently.
Therefore, it has to be more talented than if it did not encroach to enjoy even odds of reelection. (Note that the midpoint, now Proof. Consult Figure 3 . The probability that the voters' utility is above T (and the center reelected) when the center does not encroach is:
and the probability the voters' utility is above T when the center encroaches is:
The center will refrain from encroaching when the probability of being reelected with no encroachment is greater than with encroachment. Solving for C*:
which reduces to:
Since we are interested in ! "# $ %& , we can rewrite the inequality as:
It remains to be shown that ! C* " T # $, because for ! C " T # $, the probability that the center is reelected for not encroaching is 0.
which holds by assumption.
The center may be tempted to encroach when its ability is low enough that the output of its efforts is anticipated to fall short of the reelection threshold. The decision depends upon the comparison of the upside risk: which action, encroaching or not, provides the highest probability of reelection due to the variance in the outcome space?
Low type centers are attracted to high variance policy environments. They don't compare the worst cases: they seek to maximize the slim likelihood that their action generates an outcome that exceeds the threshold. But not all centers of low ability will encroach: their ability must be sufficiently low (but not too much so), and the anticipated evaluation must be sufficiently uncertain. For an intuitive graph of the logic, see Figure   4 , which represents the problem when ω is distributed normally. While the expected outcome decreases when the center encroaches, the probability that an outcome exceeds the threshold may increase for centers of low ability. The shaded region represents the increased likelihood that a center of low competence is reelected if it encroaches.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE Proposition 1 characterizes federalism's credit assignment problem: one government may try to profit by the confusion caused by shared jurisdictions. With the reduction of crime or the construction of a highway, voters aren't sure whom to credit for a positive outcome. 10 When the regional government is talented, the policy outcome is more likely to be pleasing to the voters. All else equal, centers of low ability will be more likely to encroach on regions of high ability, hoping to capture some of the credit for the policy's success. It is a straightforward corollary of the proposition that the more certain the regional policy environment (i.e. ε approaching 0), the more competent the region must be. 
encroaching has a higher payoff for low center types. It remains to be shown that ! C* " T + # , since for ! C* > T + " the center has a full probability of being reelected if it does not encroach. Given
While it is intuitive to consider the advantages to a struggling national leader of associating himself with a successful state government or gambling on risky policies, Proposition 2 argues the opposite: A strong national leader will get involved in regional policies that have not been successful when there is less variance in outcome, flipping
Weitzman's insight on its head. If you are likely to be reelected, don't take risks.
Encroachment may be less risky. In Proposition 2, the interval of potential policy outcomes is smaller when the center encroaches. The size of this interval is a function both of the uncertainty of the policy environment and of the talent of the regional government. When ε is small relative to δ, the low type center has no gambling payoff from playing entering the region's policy sphere. When ρ is small-the regional government is relatively untalented-a low type center has no incentive to encroach, as there is no credit to claim.
However, the higher type center will find it profitable to encroach to minimize the (already small) likelihood that the voter satisfaction with their effort falls below the threshold. The policy domain when the center encroaches may just have a more certain outcome associated with it, or the reduced interval may be attributed to the low ability of the regional government. When the regional government is of low ability, the voters are aware of the region's weakness (or may be more easily convinced of it by the campaigning center), and may reward the center for regional successes. Under these conditions, when the region cannot handle its responsibilities, center encroachment is serendipitous for the voters. Again, there would be a tradeoff between ε and ρ: the less certain the policy outcome from encroachment, the lower the region's ability must be for encroachment to be attractive to the center. Figure 6 presents the normal distribution case. Again, note that while the expected outcome decreases when the center encroaches, the probability that an outcome falls short of the threshold may decrease for centers of high ability. The shaded area represents the reduction in likelihood that a central government of high competence fails to meet the voters' threshold for reelection if it encroaches.
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
In federalism, a balanced division of powers is maintained when the center respects the region's policy jurisdictions. The next two propositions reveal circumstances that deter encroachment. In Proposition 3, no center encroaches when the policy uncertainty from encroachment is moderate. In Proposition 4, no moderately-abled center encroaches, regardless of the policy risk. Proof: The proof is in parts. Consider two cases: Case A, when
Proposition 3: When the policy uncertainty from encroachment is moderate, (when
and Case B, when
If A, then the probability of reelection given no encroachment is greater than the probability with encroachment by:
#, the probability of reelection is 0 when the center does not encroach.
Thereafter, the probability increases with slope
, the probability of reelection is 1.
With encroachment, for
, the probability of reelection is 0. For
, the probability increases with slope
, it follows that the probability of reelection is greater with no encroachment than from encroachment.
Case B is proven with a similar argument.
Proposition 3 describes the optimal action by the center when the policy outcome interval associated with encroachment is of moderate size. The center never encroaches, regardless of its competence. In contrast, Proposition 4 captures the notion that moderately-talented centers have no incentive to encroach.
Proposition 4: Centers of moderate competence,
Proof: Follows from Propositions 1 and 2. Figure 7 represents these regions. Centers of moderately satisfactory ability
never encroach for electoral reasons. And regional policy environments with moderately uncertain outcomes will not attract encroachment.
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
Several comparative statics may be derived from Propositions 3 and 4.
Corollary 1: As T, the performance threshold for reelection, increases, fewer centers will encroach.
Proof: The horizontal interval of no encroachment is
As θ decreases or T increases, these intervals grow larger.
Increasing the threshold increases the range of moderate uncertainty in the outcome from encroachment, and in this range, no center has an incentive to encroach.
The more voters expect from their politicians, the less they will encroach.
Corollary 2: As θ, the center's ability to perform the region's job, decreases, fewer centers encroach.
Proof: See proof for Corollary 1.
Corollary 2 provides an intuitive comparative static: as the center's handicap grows greater it will be less eager to encroach upon the regional governments. Influences on the handicap measure include the possibility that the jurisdictions are more closely policed. Electoral or political enforcement are potential sources of supervision; another is the threat of judicial review.
Corollary 3: Centers of low ability will be less likely to encroach as the regional government becomes more competent (as ρ increases). However, high ability centers may become more likely to encroach.
Proof: Follows from Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 3 demonstrates a condition for encroachment: in an echo of Madison, when the two levels of government have distinct abilities, where one is talented in a policy domain and the other is not, encroachment may be attractive to the center. When the center encroaches, the credit it receives for a policy is confounded by whatever actions the regional government is taking in that same policy area. On the positive side, the center may be able to claim credit for all of what the region does in addition to its own efforts, but it also risks losing credit for its contribution to the outcome because the region is simultaneously claiming credit. The degree of credit to be reaped, or lost, is correlated with the region's competence; for notational convenience it is simply equated to ! " .
The empirical implications of this theory will depend upon the functional specification of
( ) . Throughout the formal text, I have assumed that the uncertainty is the product of ! " and ρ, but the relationship may take any number of forms, including the sum of the elements, their product, or the minimum or maximum. In general, an additive functional form will maximize the predicted frequency of encroachment by low type centers, while a multiplicative one will minimize it. The opposite effect occurs with high type centers, since they are less likely to encroach as the uncertainty from encroachment increases.
When ! " e is determined by either the minimum or maximum of the parameters ε or ρ, the effect on frequency is again conditional on the type of center. If only the maximum of the two components matters, we'd expect a higher frequency of encroachment by low ability centers (and less by high types), because if either parameter is of high value, it is sufficient to trigger the encroachment of low competence centers. If the uncertainty associated with encroachment is determined by the minimum of the two parameters, then both parameters must be high in order to maximize the uncertainty and increase the frequency of encroachment by low type centers. Again, the effect is reversed for high type centers.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
Voters judge a government's actions by its performance, by its return to them. As long as the division of authority between the federal and state governments is at least approximately efficient, violations of the boundaries will show up as governmental underperformance. In this paper we see that there are conditions that would cause the electorate to fail to patrol federalism's boundarieseven to be counterproductive. The results call into question the adequacy of political remedies for federal opportunism.
In the corollaries we are best able to evaluate the electoral mechanism within the political safeguards argument. We see that structural and political deterrents are sufficient to prevent encroachment in many cases, particularly when governments are average or risk is moderate. However, when the federal and state governments are differently abled, or the policy risk differs substantially, automatic constraints fail to prevent the secondary effect of the electoral system: in its attempt to surpass the voters'
threshold for reelection, a center of low talent will encroach upon a competent region (or risky policy domain), and a talented center will encroach upon a challenged region or low-uncertainty policy realm. It is in these exceptional cases that a federal system would want a back-up plan, a way to correct encroachment ex post, when its ex ante protections fail.
Furthermore, since both gifted and mediocre politicians encroach, the credit assignment problem creates zones of ambiguity: encroachment is not a signal about a politician's type. If only low-competence centers encroached, then encroachment would signal ability, and sophisticated voters would vote the incumbent out of office. In the examples above, talented leaders and inexperienced opportunists alike profit by creating shared jurisdictions to take advantage of the potential to claim credit for another level's actions. Additionally, both types pursue the same political tact: they attempt to pass the region off as weak in order to claim credit. In trading the mean for variance-in some cases more, in some cases less-they maximize the probability of generating an outcome that rises above the threshold for reelection.
In sum, electoral politics create incentives for many types of central governments to encroach. We can also derive results of the opposite character: there are central governments that would never encroach, regardless of the credit-claiming potential from encroachment, and there are degrees of policy uncertainty that eliminate all temptation to encroach. These bands of no encroachment may be seen in Figure 7 . In this figure we see both the potential and the limits of electoral control to safeguard federalism. Second, even if the voters could appraise their overall welfare and learn to link it back to the division of power, contrary to the optimism of Federalist 46 they are unlikely to be able to develop meaningful sentiments about the constitutional allocation of authority, nor can they sanction violations precisely. More promising is the development of the integrated party system, 11 which when properly structured may overcome the deficits of pure electoral control by supplementing the voters' monitoring and sanctioning capacities. This paper shows that there are broad areas where political/electoral control works well. However, with the party system as safeguard the main flaw remains: the safeguard is attuned to electoral gain, the same motivator of federal encroachment.
Despite their complexity, party systems at their root depend upon electoral victory, and as Figure 7 shows, the coverage of any safeguard that relies on electoral incentives is incomplete.
The circumstantial failure of political safeguards highlights an advantage of a redundant, independent safeguard, and suggests why we might welcome judicial 11 Filippov, Ordershook, and Shvetsova, Designing Federalism (cited in note 3).
involvement the when electoral accountability hits its limits. Freed from direct electoral fetters, the court may not make the same errors prone to electoral or political safeguards.
One obvious prescription based upon these results is the need to protect the independence of the judiciary: if the court is beholden to the federal government, it is unable to patrol the federal government's actions, and therefore is an incompetent insurance against the failures of political safeguards.
As evaluator of governmental action the judiciary has a second advantage over political safeguards: it can be effective in narrow contexts. A safeguard that relies ultimately on electoral approval or rejection over a broad slate of activities is too crude to hope to manage efficiently a multi-dimensional boundary. But judicial disputes are intrinsically fine-grained. Working with complaints of one party against another over a defined injury, only the court's pronouncements of principle transform the suit from idiosyncrasy to a standard with broad application. Unlike the electorate who must accept or reject the whole portfolio of governmental actions, or the political party system, which may make more specific denunciations of action, but does so out of a desire to succeed electorally, the judiciary can make marginal adjustments to the division of authority, or prevent them. The introduction of an alternative, independent safeguard with the ability to "work around the edges" presents an opportunity to improve the overall efficiency of the union.
At a minimum, the potential for judicial enforcement of federal-state legislative boundaries is a redundant handicap on the federal government's decision to encroach.
When the counterincentives provided by political safeguards fail to prevent encroachment, judicial intervention can step in to minimize the damage done by encroachment. Such intervention can only be successful if the judiciary is sufficiently independent of federal influence, and if the judiciary develops doctrine that allows for some natural shift in jurisdictional boundaries while preventing electorally-motivated but inefficient encroachment.
V. CONCLUSION
A healthy federation does not maintain static boundaries dividing authority between levels of government but instead adapts the boundaries in response to new technologies and changing societal conceptions. Adaptation is important; it is what makes federalism robust. At the same time, not all change to the division of authority is good. Sometimes the boundaries are manipulated opportunistically. To maintain a robust federation, a safeguard must distinguish between beneficial change and opportunistic transgressions.
Political safeguards are valuable but not infallible; not all politically-supported adjustments are good for federal efficiency. In many cases the institutional structure, party politics, and the electoral system may be sufficient to police intergovernmental jurisdictional boundaries, but this article shows that exceptions will occur, even when the system functions as designed. The formal model in this paper stacks the deck against encroachment, and yet finds that encroachment will occur, not for partisan reasons, not for efficiency reasons, but because of electoral incentives. The very institution intended to suppress jurisdictional drift in the political safeguards theory has a secondary, opposite effect: it motivates disrespect for constitutional limitations when encroachment alters the uncertainty in voters' electoral evaluations. Under conditions derived here, the secondary effect will dominate, and encroachment will occur. Electoral correction is sufficient for average situations, but prone to error in the extremes of government competence and the variance in policy outcomes. The likelihood of encroachment varies with voter expectations (encroachment occurs less frequently when expectations are higher) and the imposition of obstacles to handicap the center's performance in the region's jurisdiction.
However, encroachment cannot be fully eliminated.
The key is the problem of credit assignment. No one, especially not the voters, can trace consequence back to cause perfectly. To evaluate the performance of their representative, voters examine policy, platform, legislation, implementation, and reactions. When jurisdictions intersect, multiple representatives often claim credit for good policy outcomes. In a federal system, federal representatives can encroach on states' authorities in order to create a credit assignment problem, where voters are unsure whom among their elected representatives deserves re-election.
Therefore, rather than rely upon a single safeguard, an additional one may complement the electoral guard, as an auxiliary protection, to use Madison's language from Federalist 51. It is in this capacity that judicial intervention is most useful. The court helps to balance the democratic tension between majority rule and minority rights;
by avoiding the pitfalls of short-term electoral gain, it may improve federalism as well.
Judicial patrol of the division of authority can be a beneficial complement to political safeguards. Politicians not only toot their own horn, but (to mix a metaphor) may try to steal the thunder of others. A deed well done might be rewarded, but only if your own name is attached to it. Voters do not re-elect based upon the ability of a politician to dish out praise. Uncontrolled intergovernmental competition, a lurid prospect for any federation hoping for efficiency and longevity, can be motivated by nothing more sinister 
